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The following report analyzes the  evolutiou and 
D~.oalble impact of the Federal Planning-Programing- 
Budgeting system, a 11 new" management planning and 
deetstalr-mkhg technique proposed by President John- 
son to the  heads of key government agencies. 
The report ,  which is intended t o  be an input t o  
a more detai led study of the management planning 
function, both i n  the Federal Government and pri- 
vate industry, is based on a study of selected books, 
documents, and reports  on the subject,  and on discus- 
sions with responsible and knowledgeable individuals 
in  the Federal Government, i n  research in s t i t u t e s ,  and 
in private  industry. 
and the  conclusions reached a re  the author's and do 
not necessarily represent the opinions or the  pol ic ies  
of the  Program of Policy Studies or The George Washington 
University. 
However, the opinions expressed 
C L .  
l a t e  t h i s  surmer President Johnson issued a statement t o  members of 
the Cabinet and heads of agencies tha t  w i l l  have a s ignif icant  e f fec t  on 
the management of the Federal government, par t icular ly  on the Executive 
decisfa-mak%ng process, on the respons ib i l i t i es  and prerogatives of the 
vzz~icxxs gcverzimnt ai;meics, aixl GI; t b s  b%a',ogue SeF~een the gcmermoernt 
and industr ia l  cwnnunities. In h i s  statement, the  President proposed thac 
a "new" Planning-Pragrarcming-Budgeting system be adopted throughout the 
Federal Government. In October, a direct ive was sent by the Bureau of the 
Budget t o  selected agency heads, which outlined the purpose, requzrements, 
and guidelines for establishing t h i s  new system i n  twenty-two agencies, 
and suggested tha t  seventeen other agencies give the directgve serious 
consideration.* 
While the President's statement on planning-programming and budgeting 
and the subsequent directive were issued without fanfare, the magnitude 
and potent ia l  impact of these two documents a re  implicit  i n  the objectives 
of the PPB system; namely, t o  help the Executive Office: 
Identify our national goals on a precise and continuing basis; 
Select those goals t ha t  a r e  most urgent; -
Define al ternat ive means fo r  reaching the  selected national 
goals by t he  most effective and l e a s t  cost ly  route; 
Conduct the budgeting i n  support of these goals and t h e  re la ted 
programs over a period of several years ra ther  than on a year- 
by-year basis;  
* Bulletin No, 66-3, Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the  
Budget, Washington, D.C., October 12, 1965, 
e - .  
2, 
Evaluate the national programs t o  insure "a dol lar ' s  worth 
of service for each dollar spent." 
The in s t i t u t ion  of t h i s  new management technique throughout the 
Federal Government ra i ses  a number of questions; 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting system? 
current Government operations2 What new problems and po ten t i a l i t i e s  
w i l l  it create? 
namely: What is  the 
What e f fec t  w i l l  it have on 
THE PPB SYSTEN: EVOLUTION AND RATIONALE 
The Planning-Progranming-Budgeting system the President referred t o  
I n  fact ,  it is "new" only within the context of the Federal Government. 
is based, i n  par t ,  on the management concepts, techniques and processes 
employed Over the past  ten t o  f i f t een  years by imaginative indus t r ia l  
managers, and pa r t i a l ly  on the pioneering e f fo r t s  of cer ta in  research 
organizations, notably the  RAND Corporation. 
established i n  1948 t o  conduct analyt ical  studies for  the A i r  Force, 
i n i t i a t ed  some of the f i r s t  def ini t ive research on planning, programing, 
and budgeting within RAND'S Economics Department, then headed by Charles 
J. Hitch, 
was not only one of the ffrst detailed expositions on the concept and 
practice of planning, programing and budgeting,for national defense 
purposes, but it coincided i n  timing and philosophy with the findings of 
the Symington Cormnittee on the Defense Establishment which Resident-elect  
This non-profit ins t i tu te ,  
Mr. Hitch's book, The Economics of Defense i n  the Nuclear &,* 
* Hitch, Charles J., and McKean, Roland N., a Economics of Defense -- in the Nuclear &, Harvard University Press, 1960. 
c - .  
- .  3. 
John Kennedy established i n  1960 t o  study the reorganization of the De- 
partment of Defense, 
ington Conmittee report  and Hitch's book was essent ia l ly  coincidental, it 
was a factor i n  E&, Hitch's future career; for  when President Kennedy took 
off ice  In  1961, W, Hitch was appointed DOD Comptroller and was asked by 
While the conceptual relationship between the Sprp 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNaxnara t o  put the planning and budgeting 
techniques outlined i n  h is  book in to  practice. 
Such procedural changes were long overdue since pr ior  t o  1961 a means 
for  coupling DOD planning t o  budgeting did not exist. 
planning was done on the basis of separate Army, Navy, and A i r  Force re- 
quirements, and the budgeting on the basis  of essent ia l ly  unrelated 
"Personnel," "Maintenance," and "Construction" categories. 
Defense Department 
The s i tua t ion  
was further complicated by the overemphasis on the policy of "massive 
retal ia t ion,"  which had resulted i n  an overconcentration of forces and 
weapons t o  f igh t  s t ra teg ic  war and a r e l a t ive  depletion of the forces re- 
quired t o  f igh t  l imi t ed  war. 
Moreover, the budget t o  support t h i s  unsymnetrical forces and weapons 
s t ructure  w a s  projected only one year ahead, even though many of the plan- 
ning decisions were made on weapons systems tha t  would not be operational 
for  three, f ive,  or even ten  years hence, Furthermore, the pre-1961 de- 
fense budgets not only gave l i t t l e  indication of the specif ic  resource 
implications of the planning decisions and actions, but d i d  not differen- 
t i a t e  between the i n i t i a l  and subsequent operational expenses associated 
with the related weapons developments. 
As stated by David Novick of the RAND Corporation:* 
By January of 1961 there had been a quiet  tut long-standing 
recognition of t h i s  deficiency i n  re la t ing  mil i tary budgeting 
t o  planning , , , and a recognition, a t  lwast i n  some quarters, 
4. 
,F vL  
the  new administration in 1961 embarked upon the  planning 
f o r  i t s  mil i tary ac t iv i t ies .  
introduced was the recognition of the need for  a method for  
i n t e a a t i n ?  resource p r o a r m i n g  & budgeting i n t o  mil i tary 
planninq.sd 
-* u.i;ed for m j c r  C ~ C ~ C .  It vas fc this c m t e x t  t h a t  
One of the major features  i t  
The programming and budgeting system introduced by We Hitch i n  
1961 a d  put to !its lnitial t e s t  in the prepara t im Q€ the Defense Budget 
for  the f i s c a l  year 1963 was the f i r s t  major s tep  toward meeting the need 
for  coordinated budgeting and planning in  the Department of Defense. 
addition the new system included: 1) a DOD program package (see Fig, 1) 
In 
which w a s  proposed and implemented on the bas i s  of overal l  Defense m i s -  
sions and force requirements ra ther  than on a narrow service-by-service 
basis;  2) detailed,  in-deprh analyses of a l te rna t ives  t o  meet spec i f ic  
mil i tary objectives and missions; and, 3) a five-year force s t ruc ture  
and f inancial  program, 
However, the impact of the  PPB system went f a r  beyond basic procedu- 
r a l  changes. Eventual3y DOD decision-naking became more centralized; 
new organizational elements were created; the process of evaluating wea- 
pons proposals and select ing contractors w a s  modified; and the management 
power center shif ted from the services t o  the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. In addition, the Department of Defense was Sunctionally, i f  not 
formally, reorganized; major a c t i v i t i e s  which cut  across service l ines ,  
* Novick, David, Program Budnetinq i n  t h e  Department of Defense, 
The RAND Corporation, RI4-4210-RC, September, 1964. 
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sir& as cmmmicatf~as, supply, and intel l igence,  were centraiized; r'ormai 
plans and budgets covering a five-year -0 ra ther  than one-year period were 
put i n to  e f fec t ;  and a basically uniform budget procedure and accounting 
system was estaBlished. 
The adoption of planning-prograaming agd budgeting by the  Department 
of Defense has a l so  had d i rec t  and ind i rec t  e f f ec t s  on weapons procurement 
procedures and, consequently, on Gavernment/industry relationships,* Posi- 
t i v e  evidence of these e f fec ts  can be found by examining the controversy 
t h a t  surrcjunded the decisions t o  develop the E-111 (nee TFX) fighter- 
bomber and t o  cancel the Skybolt missile, 
The implementation of planning-programming and budgeting within DOD 
a l s o  i n i t i a t e d  a quie t  and continuing revolution i n  the defense industry: 
marketing, planning, and contractual procedures i n  the aerospace industry 
were modified; cost-effectiveness and planning groups created or  stre**= 
ened; and the t r ad i t i ona l  technical emphasis i n  top management sh i f ted  +n 
the  direct ion of broader management; capabili t ies.  
companies the in tu i t i ve  "shoot-from-the-hip" executive was repleced by men 
For example, i n  some 
experienced i n  the more sophisticated management techniques of planning, 
systems engineering, and methodical decision-making, 
lhis is  not t o  say t h a t  planning, programming and budgeting were in- 
troduced t o  DOD without problems, o r  t h a t  the new system w a s  t o t a l l y  effec- 
t i v e  from the beginning; in  fact ,  there was and s t i l l  is objective and subs 
* See Root, Eugene L., "Project Management Vrom a Defense Industry 
Point of View," t a l k  before the  Air Force I n s t i t u t e  of Technology, 
Project Management Course, October 1, 1965, page 24. 
. -  
7, 
j ec t ive  criticism of the programning anu budgeting technique (both within 
and outside the Department), particularly,  the use of cost-effectiveness 
studies, systems analyses, and cmputer techniques. It is beyond the scope 
of t h i s  paper t o  evaluate the basis and nature bf t h i s  critlcism, however, 
former DOD Comptroller Charles E. Hitch stated h h i s  recent book:* 
h c h  of the cr i t ic ism directed against the technique Of using 
cost-effectiveness s t u d i e s  or systems analysis i s  r ea l ly  related 
t o  specific decisions; people who for  one reason or another dis- 
l ike a particular decision attempt t o  f au l t  the technique and 
rationale which led t o  it. Let  it be said, here and now, the 
computers do not make decisions and neither do systems analysts. 
The jmb of the systems analyst is t o  f ree  the decision-maker 
from questions which can best  be resolved on the basis of 
judgement. The systems analyst, for  example, can te l l  the 
decision-maker how many more targets  would be destroyed if 
two hundred new bombers were added t o  the planned force and 
how much they would cost; he can rarely demonstrate whether 
they should or should not be added ... It seems t o  me t ha t  
anyone who has t o  make the kind of decisions which f a l l  t o  
the l o t  of the  Secretary of Defense would want t o  have some- 
thing more t o  rest on than unsubstantiated judgement, even 
though tha t  judgement is based on extensive, i f  not wholly 
relevant, experience. 
- THE FEDERAL - PPB SYSTE1.i: CONCEPT CHARACTER 
'fhe.:Banning-Ro~,tamming-Budgeting system tha t  has provided the 
analyt ical  and procedural base for  the many changes tha t  have taken 
place i n  the Department of Defense, and is now to  be employed through- 
out the Federal Government i s  a management technique for  systematically 
defining primary objectives and al ternat ives ,  then matching these objec- 
t ives  and al ternat ives  t o  the appropriate resources, within a structured 
* Hitch, Charles J., for Defense, University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965, 
. -  
8,  
informatian matrix. This technique i s  designed t o  a s s i s t  top rizzwgement 
i n  i t s  plannins, decision-mkins, and di rec t ive  responsibi l i t ies .  
The President's request t ha t  this technique be adopted by the key 
Federal agencies has come about for tvo basic reasons: f i r s t ,  because of 
the successful applicatfon of the PPB system n i th in  the Department of De- 
fense; and second, a recognition of fundamental defects i n  the Governmen- 
t a l  decision-making and budgeting prcxesses. The nature of these defects  
was sharply defined by Henry S. Rowen, Assistant Director, Bureau of the 
Budget, who s ta ted  i n  a recent speech * tha t  under the present system: 
. ,program descriptions and ju s t i f i ca t ions  are vague, incomplete, 
and unquantified; objectives a re  s ta ted unclearly; sometimes they 
a r e  inconsistent internal ly  or with other programs; measures of 
performance a re  missing, of dubious va l id i ty  and too l i t t l e  Quan- 
t i f i ed ;  cost  estimates are poor and 5iased; a l te rna t ive  objectives, 
a l te rna t ive  programs t o  reach these objectives o r  d i f fe ren t  levels 
within a given program arc  not suggested; records of program 
performance and cos ts  as conpared with promises a r e  poor; and re- 
quirements a re  s ta ted in absolute terms, 
the need.' 'tJe must attair! t h i s  level.' 
can be more or less of a given program is resisted.  
there are very few tilings in life, or a t  least in Federal programs 
of KMch t h a t  is true, 
l i t t l e  systematic information on vhat it should be t rying t o  
accomplish, what the best ways OF accomplishing these objectives 
arc, and how its programs arz? faring. 
We a r e  told: 'This is 
The notion that there  
In fac t ,  
In  short, of ten  top management has too 
Tbe PPB system, which w i l l  tiopefully improve the dtuat iou desaribd 
achieve such objectives; and the select ion of an opgixnum course, or 
courses, of action from among these alternatives.* * 
* Rowen, Henry S., "Improving Decision-Making in Government," speech 
before t b e  Budget Bureau's Summer Seminar on Systems Analysfs and 
Program Evaluation, Executive Office of the President, Washington, 
** For a discussion of the planning process, see Scott, Brian I.J., 
D.C., &gust 19, 1965. 
Low-Ranze Planninq & &erica*- Industrv , American a n a g e m n t  
Association, Inc., New York, N e w  York, 1965. 
Prorraming - the definition 2nd scheduling of the  major programs 
or a c t i v i t i e s  designed t o  meet t t i c  planning objectives, and the coupling 
of these prcgrams to the appropriate canpower, material, and f a c i l i t y  re- 
quirements, 
Budseting - the coupling of spec i f ic  budget do l la rs  t o  t he  overall 
nationa: or agency objectives, the  spec i f ic  programs, and the  re lated man- 
power, m t e r i a l ,  and f a c i l i t y  resources, 
&wen t i gh t ly  in to  the  fabr ic  of planning-programming and budgeting 
is  a complex analyt ical  process defined a s  systems, cos t /u t i l i ty ,  or cos t  
effectiveness analysis. Regardless of the def in i t ion  eiuployed, t h e  bas i c  
character of t h i s  ana ly t ica l  process is the same. 
functions: 
means for achieving such objectives within an environment characterized 
by uncertainty, a future  time scale ,  and a complex spectrum of technolo- 
It includes two prime 
1) systematic analyses  of objectives and the a l te rna t ive  
gical ,  po l i t i ca l ,  and economic parameters; and 2) comparative evaluations 
of the cost and utility of t h e  various 05jectives, a l ternat ives ,  and 
related program. 
';a the conduct of systcms os c o z t / u t i l i t y  analyses, it is necessary 
t o  define the scope of thc  problem by posing appropriate questions and 
designing an analyt ical  framework to answer these questions. In some 
cases it may be helpful to construct a decision-making model which is 
then used to detcrmine the relationehip between, as well as the  cost  and 
u t i l i t y  of ,  the program objectives and the  various al ternat ives ,  However, 
10. 
since it i s  only a theoretics1 st1-3~ cure, it is desirable t o  test  the 
model within a range of possi'ulc "reai-world" situati0ns.f: 
In addition to i ts  functional an? analy t ica l  character, the Plan- 
ning-Programing-budgeting s y s t m  includes the design of a program pack- 
age. 
or "program", one of the best concepts and def in i t ions  of what a program 
involves ex is t s  i n  the Department of Defense (see Pig. 1). 
While there i s  no cornon def in i t ion  of the term "program package" 
Using the DOD program package as a guide it is  possible t o  def ine 
To i l l u s t r a t e ,  similar s t ructures  f o r  other najor Frlderal ac t iv i t i e s .  
planning, and budgeting i n  the important area of transportation is pre- 
sently a highly fragzented act ivi ty ,  scattered throughout a var ie ty  of 
Federal agencies such as the FAA, the Coast Guard, and the  Department of 
C-rce. 
loesely defined transportation a c t i v i t i e s  including: aviation, highways, 
and t r u s t  funds, 
lhese agencies, i n  turn,  a re  responsible for  a number of 
This structure Zives l i t t l e  or no indication of 
national t r anspor t a t im  objectives, f u t w e  plans, or al ternat ives ,  and 
is primarily based on t tad i t iona l  agency roles and missions =- the over& 
a l l  natioiial need is not apparent. 
thder a new format suggested by the Bureau of the Budget, trans- 
portation programs and budgets would be defined on the bas i s  of overal l  
national requirements. (See Fig. 2) In comparing the current program 
with the suggested oae, it i s  apparent t h a t  i n  the former case the 
agencies * t r ad i t i ona l  agency respons ib i l i t i es  and prerogatives a re  
* For a detai led discussion on cos t -u t i l i ty  analysis see: Novick, 
David, (Zditor) , Promani Budgeting, Chapter 2, Government Printing 
Office, Washington, i'.iJ., 1965. 
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stressed; 
Furthermore, it is  clear  t h a t  i f  t he  Federal Government were t o  s h i f t  from 
an agency-oriented transportation program t o  one t h a t  emphasizes overa l l  
nat ional  objectives, significant: chanzes i n  the  current power s t ructure ,  
t h e  decisioa-making processes and the re lated budgetary al locat ions would 
take placei 
i n  the l a t t e r  case K h e  nat ional  requirements are emphasieed, 
THE E-PACT 
In a larger  sense, it is reasonable t o  assume t h a t  s ign i f icant  
changes w i l l  not only take place i n  t h e  area of transportation, as a 
r e s u l t  of $brining, p r o g r a d n g  and budgeting, but inthe operation of 
the Federal Government as a whole; part iculat ly ,  i n  the respons ib i l i t i es ,  
6bjectSVesj and dpprdpriatfoh tevels of those agencies affected by the 
Prestdential  directive.* 
One of thc most itcmeaiatc and far-reaching changes proposed involves 
the annual Federal budget review and fornulation process. 
under the current procedures, the budget formulation and review is croY;r 
ded i n t o  a few months w i t h  little ar no machinery for  monitoring, analms, 
or relpccgramming throughout the year, 
cycle (see Fig, 3), proposed as part of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
system would operate over a twelve-month period and include the following 
s teps  : * 
For example, 
In  contrast ,  the  nes  annual budget 
* President Johnson in his Sta te  of the  Union Message t o  Congress has 
suggested tha t  a ncv Transportation Agency be established. 
* Figure 3 and the budget cycle discussed above are  based on data in The 
Bureau of the  Budget Bulletin, No. 66-3, Washington, D.C. Oct. 12, 1965. 
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3.4. 
In January, relevant Federal agancies w i l l  make changes i n  the 
p r i m  tnultibyear program plan. 
decisions a s  ref lected in t h e  judget sent t o  the Congress. 
These changes conform t o  President ia l  
By :.larch bureaus or similar major organizational units within the  
agency will submit t o  the agency head current appraisals of approved 
program objectives and multi-year plans as w e l l  as proposals for: 
needed modiEications, including measures t o  meet new needs and t o  take 
accant of changing and expiring needs; and 2) expansion of plans t o  
c m e r  an additional year. 
advtse the agency head of any change in t hc  overal l  pol ic ies  and objec- 
tives upon which the currently approved plan i s  based. 
1) 
'Lhe Director of t he  Bureau of the Budget w i l l  
In A m i L  Each bureau w i l l  develop spec i f ic  program plans, on the  
bas i s  of inst ruct ions f r m  the agency head and following h i s  r e v i e w  of 
individual bureau submissions, 
In May analyt ic  s t a f f s  w i l l  cocpfcte the program memoranda, 'he 
agency head then reviews program plans and approves the program memoranda 
for submission t o  the Bureau of the Budget. On the  bas i s  of t h i s  review, 
the agency head may want t o  azsign addi t ional  studies t o  h i s  staff. 
In May-June the budget preview is conducted by the  Bureau of the  
Budget. me basic documents for  t h i s  preview axe the program memoranda 
prepared by agencies and submitted to the  Bureau of the  Budget by Map 1, 
and s p e d a l  s tudies  to  be submitted over a period of several  months pre- 
ceding t h i s  date. 
tained, where necessary, on major policy issues and on the f i s c a l  outlook, 
During t h i s  period President ia l  guidance w i l l  be ob- 
In  Julv-Aunust appropriate changes t o  program plans a re  made on the  
basis  of the Presiciential guidance, and Congressional l eg i s l a t ion  and 
appropriations. Budget estimates, including those for new l eg i s l a t ive  
15 
proposals, are developed on thc basis of the f i r s t  year of t he  currently 
approved program plans. 
3x1 September budget estimates and agency leg is la t ive  programs are 
submitted by the agency heads t o  the  Bureau of the  Budget. 
In October-December the Budget Bureau reviews budget estimates, 
consults with agencies, and makes i ts  reconmendations to the  Resident ,  
Presidential decisions are transmitted t o  agencies$ the budget is pre- 
pared fo r  submission t o  Congress; the leg is la t ive  program is specified; 
and the various national goals and objectives are  defined. 
In January the annual cycle i s  completed and a new one ini t ia ted.  
aanges  a re  again made by the agencies to the milti-year program plan 
t o  confotm t o  Presidential  decisions, as reflected i n  the budget sent 
t o  Congress, 
In addition t o  a new budget cycle, other changes, resul t ing from 
the  Planning-Rograaaning-Budgeting directive,  have already taken place, 
For example, each agency named i n  the direct ive has selected an indi- 
vidual t o  d i rec t  i t s  Planning-Puogrdng-Budgeting system, who, with the 
appropriate staff, has been asked t o  define specif ic  program categories, 
%e program definit ions,  a s  well as other a c t i v i t i e s  specified in the BOB 
directive*, are to be in i t ia ted  by the  relevant agancies between now and 
May 1, 1966, when each agency's multi-year program plan, the related 
program memoranda, and the special studies w i l l  be forwarded for preview 
by the Bureau of the Budget. 
~ -~ 
* Reference No. 1 
. .  . 
Related t o  the BOB directive,  it was announced on November 9,1965, 
t ha t  Res ident  Johnson had approved ii plan for reorganizing the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare. * .  
taken as a r e su l t  of t h i s  plan was the creation of a new Office of Comp- 
troller. This act ian and the re la ted responsibil i ty of the  new posit ion 
are  analogous t o  the ciraumstances ararrnrmding the creation of the 
OEfice of Deputy Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in 1961. Like the  
DOD decision, the objective of the new HEW plan is to  central ize  manage- 
ment and budgetary control mer the many off ices  reporting d i rec t ly  t o  
HEW Secretary John Gardner,and t o  authorize and direct the necessary 
systems analysis and cost/effectiveness studies. 
One of the  most significant s teps  
Also in l ine  with the BOB directive,  it was announced i n  the NOV- 
ember 15th issue of the  New York Times t ha t  a special  eight-man Fred- 
dent ia l  Coamission, headed by the former Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget, Kermi t  Gordon, has begun working on far-reaching proposals t o  
reorganize ahd glan for the  total Federal e f for t  on urban housing, 
pojettg, and mass transportation.:sc As quoted i h  ihc ?bless sin unnatned 
Federal o f f i c i a l  stated,  "Wganizationally t h i s  (committee study) is  
prcbably as d i f f i c u l t  and significant a job as the reorganization & 
unification of the armed forces i n  1947. - The idea is to pul l  a11 
urbad assistance programs together, for  the f i r s t  time, in to  a coordina- 
ted thrust  tha t  w i l l  have some impact on the problems." 
* Qashinaton Post, November 9, 1965. 
* New York Times November 15, 1965. - --* 
.k*.k Emphasis added 
Other changes i n  the organization and management processes of key 
Govermnt  agencies a re  anticipated as a consequence of the PPB directive,  
For example, an increase i n  the analyt ical  and R & D capabili ty,  w i t h h ,  
and external to ,  the major Federal agencies - part icular ly- those agencies 
concerned w i t h  non-defense problems - w i l l  take place. 
w i l l  be characterized by the gradual acquis i t ion of sk i l led  analysts and 
planners within and outside the relevant organizations, the  creation of 
spectal  interdiscipl inary s t a f f s  t o  assist top management, and increases 
La the R & D expenditures of non-defense agencies and bureaus. 
This evolution 
PROBLEXS AND PCTENTIAL 
These firm and anticipated changes indicate  - as does the DOD expet- 
ience - t ha t  planning-prograu~ning and budgeting w i l l  have an evolution- 
ary, if not revolutionary, impact on the Federal Government, While the 
system w i l l  ultimately bring about a better-planned and more e f f i c i e n t  
opetatiori, i t r  is not: a panacea fox of the management ills p laguhg 
the Federal Government. 
syotem is not a perfect  device ahd w i l l  no t  be ins ta l led  w i t h o u t  expen- 
dit1ire8 of the, e f fo r t ,  and manpower. Di f f icu l t ies  are baund t o  a r i s e  
for a number of reasons including: the unfamiliari ty of many Government 
o f f i c i a l s  with the PPB technique; the procedural and organizational prob- 
i.loreover, the Planning-Programming-Budget* 
lems tha t  occur when a new process is superimposed on exis t ing orgauiza- 
tions; the lack of, or inexperience of, competent planners and systems 
analysts within the Federal Government; and the existence of bureaucratic 
pressures against the new system resu l t ing  from fears  of loss of power 
and the revelation of overlapping o r  i ne f f i c i en t  programs. Opposition 
I 
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t o  thc  system w i l l  a l so  come fron i-ndustrial organizations t h a t  work 
closely with a given Federal agency and who do not want t o  see a famil- 
i a r .  and prof i table  relationship disturbed. 
Other problems of a more operational nature w i l l  arise.  For exam- 
ple,  it w i l l  be d i f f i cu t t ,  i n i t i a l l y ,  t o  ident i fy  programs and program 
elements, such as education and foreign policy, t h a t  cut  across the  re- 
spons ib i l i t i es  of a number of agencies, and t o  s t ructure  these programs 
for  budgetary and decision-making purposes. 
of 
than one agency w i l l  be a d i f f i c u l t  one t o  resolve. 
Furthermore, the question 
w i l l  be responsible f o r  defining those programs tha t  involve more 
As a consequence, each agency head w i l l  have t o  answer a number of 
questions; namely: What i s  our role and mission? How should our pro- 
gram package be designed? How many and what kindsof program categor- 
ies are  relevant? 
with other agencies? 
i t y  of more than otte agency, (this may be the r u l e  ra ther  than the ex- 
ception) it may be necessary t o  create  new sUpte-btgiliizat€ds such as 
the Defense Comrrmnications Agency, or inter-agency committees such as 
the Jo in t  DOD/l?ASA Gemini Program Planning Board, 
What program respons ib i l i t i es  do w e  or w i l l  we share 
In  cases where major programs are t he  responsibil- 
To incorporate the new system, the various agencies' planning and 
budgeting s t a f f s  w i l l  have to  understand, in theory a s  well  as i n  the  
prac t ica l  terms of day-to-day agency operations, the management-decision 
making process. 
under ideal  circumstances the decision-making process is  a complex one, 
especially as  i t  functions within a given agency s t ruc ture  where indi- 
vidual decisions - even major ones - a re  hard t o  t race  and analyze. 
Such understanding w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  because even 
19. 
For a while the old and thc new systems w i l l  ex i s t  i n  parallel .  
Consequently, there w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t i e s  in get t ing  s t a f f  members fam- 
i l i a r  with the current method of decision-making, pfanning, and budget- 
ing adjusted t o  t h e  new techniques. 
the present budget cycle and short-term costs, agency heads w i l l  also 
have d i f f i cu l ty  adapting t o  the new system, wherein decisions w i l l  be 
based on long-term costs and multi-year budgets. In  addition, it w i l l  
be d i f f i c u l t  for  each agency t o  obtain and prepare r e l i ab le  cost  esti- 
mates for  the various programs and program elements. This w i l l  r e s u l t  
in an i n i t i a l l y  high degree of error ,  and may create  confusion ahd 
f rus t ra t ion  within agency s t a f f s  and i n  the  Bureau of the Budget. 
Since they a re  more familiar with 
There w i l l  a l so  be instances where the  objectives of planning, 
programming and budgeting w i l l  c lash with those of the  agency headr 
Reire it: should be hoted that  the success of PPB techniques i n  the 
r)ep8rtment of Defehse was largely a function of Secretsty &NaaEira's 
belief in,  and strong support for  planning, programming and budget- 
ing. 
the system as Mr. McNamara does, or  may resist it - par t icu lar ly  i f  
it clashes with the& goals sn6 mo~ivations. 
Other agency and bureau heads may not f e e l  as strongly about 
Adoption of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting system may even- 
tua l ly  lead t o  further central izat ion of inter-  as  well  as intra-agency 
management. This, i n  turn, may re su l t  i n  organizational changes as  
w e l l  a s  sh i f t s  i n  the power and s t a tus  of exis t ing agencies and re- 
la ted personnel. 
Federal management may be beneficial  and more e f f ic ien t .  However, it 
w i l l  be necessary t o  guard against overcentralization of the planning 
To a degree, a trend toward a more centralized 
. .  
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and analysis e f for t ,  
s ta f f  responsible for the agency plan and the related analyses t o  re- 
gard the i r  output as  dogma and t o  resist constructive suggestions from 
whatever source. 
high-risk proposals may not be considered unless a system for sub- 
mitting "off-beat" ideas and counter-proposals , is  instal led before 
hand, 
For example, there may be a tendency for  the 
Moreover, a range of alternatives,  or imaginative, 
As previously noted, the present budget s t ructure  w i l l  continue t o  
ex i s t  s i d e  by s i d e  with the new one for  an indefini te  period. 
quently, there w i l l  be some duplication and possibly confl ic ts  about 
program and budgetary definitions. These d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i l l  be mini- 
mized i f  the new budget structure is  geared as  closely to the present 
cycle until a smooth t ransi t ion takes place. 
Conse- 
There w i l l  be a btoblem hiritlg and t ra ining adequate numbers of 
analysts t o  man tHe p ~ a m h g ,  programing, and budgetfig s t a f f s  w i t h h  
the various agencies. Unfortunately, such individuals cannot be 
created by directives or wishful thinking. 
good analysts,currently employed i n  challenging and good-paying jobs, 
are  i n  short  supply, both in and out of government, 
the experienced planners and systems analysts have obtained t h e i r  ex- 
perience i n  the defense industry or with defense-oriented, non-profit 
ins t i tu t ions  such as RAND, Mitre, and Aerospace. Consequently, it may 
be d i f f i c u l t  t o  adapt t h e i r  t a len ts  and experience t o  such non-defense 
problems as  health, poverty, and water pollution, This problem can be 
minimized somewhat by drawing from the experience of those aerospace 
company and MID analysts and planners who have u t i l i zed  t h e i r  t a l en t s  
In addition, the f ac t  t ha t  
Moreover, most of 
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t o  solve non-defense problemc for Federal, s t a t e ,  and local  governinents.* 
Other problems w i l l  be created by cer ta in  l eg i s l a t ive  and pr iva te  
in t e re s t s  who w i l l  oppose the new Planning-Pr0gramd.q-Budgeting system. 
To many of these individuals and organizations, the system w i l l  appear 
as a threat t o  t h e i r  status,  power, and prerogatives. 
of the resis tance will be Dinimized because the development and appli- 
cation of planning, programing, and budgeting is being watched closely 
by the  President, who has also directed the Bureau of the Budget t o  
work closely with each agency hedd t o  see tha t  the PPB di rec t ives  and 
guidelines a re  followed. But in the main, oppositton t o  the  PP3 w i l l  
have t o  be overcome slowly by t ra ining capable planning and ana ly t ica l  
staffs, by R e s i d e n t i a l  or  agency-head actions,  and by prac t i ca l  demon- 
s t ra t ions  t h a t  planning, programing, and budgeting w i l l  work. 
To a degree, some 
Finally, tiie pace a t  which planning, programming and budgeting is 
adopted, the tydes and magnitude of t h e  problems tha t  a t i s e ,  the manner 
in which solutions t o  such problems a re  found, and the  eff ic iency with 
which the PPI3 rystem is ut i l ized ,  w i l l  depend upon the  conscientious 
e f fo r t s  of many individuals t i i thin and outside of the Federal Establish- 
ment, who believe tha t  a more ra t iona l ly  planned and e f f i c i en t  govern* 
ment is  a desirable goal t o  work toward. 
II * See Terhorst, Jerald,  "The Business Kole i n  the Great Society, 
The Reporter, October 12, 1965, p. 26. 
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COhTLUS IONS 
0 The Federal Planning-Programming and Budgeting system proposed by 
Res ident  Johnson and currently being adopted by twenty-tu0 Federal 
agencies evolved from the  techniques of modern management, the e f f o r t s  
of the research and academic comaunities, and the experience of the  
Department of Defense. This systeta w i l l  have a s ignif icant ,  i f  not 
revolutionary, impact on the m a n a g e n t  of the Federal Governmerit, 
par t icular ly  on the l’residentia’i decision-making process, on the re- 
spons ib i l i t i es  and prerogatives of the various Federal agencies, and on 
the  application of public and pr iva te  resources t o  meet major national 
goals , 
0 Within the Department of Defense, planning-programing and budgeting 
had d i r e c t  and ind i rec t  effects on the organization of the Department; 
on budgetary, contractual, and procurement procedures; on t he  decision- 
making process; and on the DObIndustry relationships. This, i n  turn, 
has brought about analogous changes i n  the defense industry tha t  are 
ref lected i n  the organization, management, and operating methods of 
specif tc  companies. 
0 To incorporate the  Planning-Programdug-Budgeting system i n t o  the Fed- 
e r a l  Government with a &hum of d i f f i cu l ty ,  it w i l l  be necessary t o  
understand and adapt the system to the  President ia l  as  w e l l  as the  
agency decision-making process. 
0 A number of d i f f i c u l t  but soluble problems w i l l  arise a s  planning, pro- 
gramming, and budgeting techniques a r e  adopted, These problems include: 
the  unfamiliarity of many Governaent o f f i c i a l s  with the PPB process; 
the lack of or inexperience of planners and systems analysts  within 
the Federal Government, and the  existence of bureaucratic pressures 
against  the system because of fears of loss  of organizational and per- 
sonal power, s ta tus ,  and prerogatives. To many the  system w i l l  appear 
as a d i rec t  th rea t  which w i l l  not be diminished by exhortations or pro- 
m i s e s  of a more e f f i c i en t  government. 
acceptance, the pace a t  which PPB is adopted, the t y w s  and magnitude 
of the problems tha t  a r i se ,  the rtanner in which solutions t o  such prob- 
lems are  found, and the efficiency with which the system is u t i l i zed  
w i l l  depend on the e f fo r t s  and support of determined and conscientious 
individuals within and outside t h e  Federal Government. 
Consequently, the degree of 
0 One possible solution t o  the re la ted  problems of PPB acceptance and 
acquiring or t ra in ing  systems analysts and planners is t o  es tab l i sh  
within the Washington, D ~ C I  ated a apecial  School& %is institution 
would h s t r u c t  agency staff and management personnel i n  the various 
techniques of planning-programing and budgeting. It would draw on 
experienced personnel drawn from the academic, i ndus t r i a l  and govern- 
ment cormunities and bring together planners and systems analysts  f r o m  
Government and pr iva te  organizations. 
special s tudies  or  exchange information on t h e i r  respective planning 
arid budgeting techniques. Such seminars should increase the rapport 
between industry and government, create  a be t t e r  understanding of each 
others' problems and d i f f i cu l t i e s ,  and minimize some of the resis tance 
t o  planning, prograrnmLng and budgeting within and outside the Federal 
Government. 
They would e i the r  oonduct 
. .  
SUGGESTED STUDIES 
0 Ihe impact of the Planning-Progrananing-Budgeting system on the organi- 
zation end operation of specific Federal agencies such as NASA, the  State 
Department, and HEW, 
@ 'Ihe managerial, organizational, and procedural problems ar is ing from 
the introdbction of planning, programming and budgeting: 
solutions, guidelines, or approaches, 
some possible 
D-ta requirements for the  Federal Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
system. 
Cost /ut i l i ty  criteria for evaluating such national programs as trans- 
por ta t im;  space, atld education, 
0 
0 Ihe r e l a t i a s h i 9  bebeen national objectives and Federal agenty objec- 
tives. 
0 Cri te r ia  for eelecting and training a planning, programming, and bud- 
geting s t a f f  - 
6 The ro le  of the agency head i n  the Res iden t i a l  decision-making process. 
8 The national space program: some considerations for aerospace manage- 
ment. 
0 The impact of planning, programdng and budgeting on the organization, 
management and decision-making process within the Department of Defense. 
0 Similar i t ies  and/or differences between planning, prograrmaing, and bud- 
getfng for defense and non-defense programs. 
. .  
0 Planning, p r o g r a d n g ,  and budgeting as applied t o  the propoeed Boston 
t o  tJashington high-speed transit system. 
0 The impact of Federal planning, programming, and budgeting on the  Gov- 
ermaent/Industry relationships, 
C The role ~f the President md the Executive Bffice €E the  plaming, 
progrnmnfaa and budgeting process. 
The impact of Suviet competition and or th rea ts  on major national 
goals and programs. 
lhe m: A case h is tory  in planning, programing, and bbdgeting. 
1’0 COMSlBTi an exception of a &del- fbr  managing mJcr fedstal-progr~.m.  
a The probability and impact of a Soviet manned lunar landing on the. 
U,S, space program, 
0 Cri te r ia  for  select ing post-Apollo goals i n  space, 
c 
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